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Abstract
In a period where Western donors and economic powers are oc-
cupied with own domestic issues, China intensifies its economic ties
with Africa. This paper sheds light on this engagement by evalu-
ating the influence of financial capital flows from China on the debt
sustainability and country risk of selected African countries. As such,
sovereign bond ratings are estimated on several macroeconomic vari-
ables and included in a yield spread panel data framework in order
to evaluate the external impact.
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I Introduction
Chinese engagement on the African continent has already been existing
for several decades. However, the involvement of China in African economies
as well as the resources employed have reached new heights. The new
emerged economic power is seemingly engaging in Africa on new terms;
terms that are not shaped by traditional powers, nor perhaps even by
Africans themselves. Particularly in a period where Western donors and
economic powers are often occupied with their own domestic issues, China
enlarges its field and intensifies economic ties. This paper tentatively wants
to shed light on this engagement by evaluating the impact of financial
capital flows from China on the debt sustainability and country risk of
selected African countries.
The structure of the work is as following: Section II provides back-
ground information of the Sino-African liaison as well as on the reason
for the countries chosen. Section III lays out the general theoretical frame-
work. It commences with a short literature review on bond rating estima-
tion techniques and and leads over to Part IV which introduces variables
and the technical approach used to obtain a synthetic rating with which
a quantification of Chinese financial flows on African countries debt sus-
tainability, i.e. risk of default on debt is attempted. Section V tries to relate
these bond ratings to bond spreads and checks for influence of Chinese
capital flows and Section VI follows with a conclusion.
II Sino-African Economic Relations
The ties between modern China and Africa had already been established
as recent as 1955 with the Bandung Conference as the first large-scale
Asian-African meeting taking place in Indonesia. On May 30, 1956, China
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established the first formal diplomatic relationship in Africa, with Egypt.
Ever since, China has been fostering, cultivating and maintaining ties by
spreading revolutionary ideology and offering economic and military sup-
port to its African friends, in particular when countries were cut off from
official intergovernmental assistance due to dubious political regimes or
political upheaval. However, China changed course in the 1980s. After
adopting the open door policy, China has played down the role of politi-
cal and ideological considerations, increased the weight on economic co-
operation and development, and emphasized the principles of peaceful
coexistence. According to Cheung, de Haan, Qian, and Yu (2011), China
by 2010 has established a formal diplomatic relationship with 49 of the 54
countries on the African continent and conducts direct investments in 48
of these 49 countries.
The rising economic engagement and accompanying prominence of
Chinese aid, export credits, and bank finance has produced both enthu-
siasm and concern among those concerned with development, as China’s
proclaimed non-interference in other countries’ internal issues separates
business from politics. Some believe that Chinese practices in official aid,
preferential export credits, and other forms of development finance pose
a significant challenge to the norms governing the international aid ar-
chitecture. Others welcome the rise of a new development partner, one
with seemingly deep pockets, and suggest that the Chinese might provide
new leverage to countries faced with conditionality-based aid advocated
by traditional donors (Braeutigam 2010). As the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (2006) states, China’s aid to and investment in Africa are typ-
ically unconditional, i.e. they do not tie to either political, economic, or
governance reforms.
In the next paragraph, more information on Chinese actors as well as
on lending purposes and structure will be provided.
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1 Actors on the Chinese Side
As said before, ties between China and Africa have already reached a long-
lasting tradition. China’s rise to an economic super power during the last
decade and the taking up of the role as advocate of the developing world
have led to an intensification of these links through a variety of ways,
ranging from academic exchange to currency swaps in order to increase
the internationalization of the Renminbi. Yet, financial support of under-
developed countries has been proved to be among the most successful and
effective strategies.
Financial flows from China are mostly channeled through a vast num-
ber of institutions and are strategically devised by the Chinese govern-
ment. Its willingness to large-scale investments in Africa are mainly driven
by two factors: the hunger for commodities to fuel domestic economic
growth, and the diversification of its investment portfolio loaded with bil-
lions of foreign exchange1.
To secure energy and resource assets in order to hedge against rising
commodity prices and possibly long-term supply shortages, the Chinese
Government is encouraging its companies to secure an array of commod-
ity assets (Davies 2010). Moreover, the presence of Chinese companies
abroad is heavily supported by preferred credit lines from the govern-
ment. Also Chinese banking institutions have been expanding their loan
portfolios in Africa. This is true for both Chinese policy banks as well as
for commercial lending institutions. Among principal lenders are the Chi-
nese EXIM Bank for export-import financing, China Development Bank
1Despite of a shrink in foreign reserves for the first time since the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1998 by about US$20.5 billion, the country still controls almost US$3.2 trillion of
in official currency reserves (Rabinovitch 2012).
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through its recently launched China-Africa Development Fund, China Con-
struction Bank, as well as the Industrial Commercial Bank of China ICBC.
(Davies 2010)
The characteristics of Chinese capital flows are quite subtle and afore-
mentioned institutions contribute in several ways to an increasing amount
of Sino-African financial streams. Financial flows to the African continent
consist of an amalgam of outward direct investments (ODI), concessional
loans or export buyer’s credits and to all of them very little or no debt ser-
vice requirements are attached. Unfortunately, explicit data on the struc-
ture of these flows is either scarce or sources are inconsistent and not really
revealing.
These funds are provided on a non-conditional basis and are used for a
myriad form of purposes, yet mainly developing finance in form of infras-
tructure 2. According to the World Bank, Chinas investment commitments
to infrastructure build in Sub-Saharan Africa was more than $US 7 billion
in 2006 Chinas declared “Year of Africa”. In the following year it commit-
ted a further $US 4.5 billion. Chinas investment in African infrastructure is
often considered as being merely focusing on extractive sectors and tied to
China interests that pertain to resource security. Yet, as Chinas investment
in Africa both broadens geographically and deepens in financial commit-
ment, China itself will increasingly have a vested interest in Africas long-
term developmental success. While Africas GDP performance has been
2Infrastructure is the core of China Exim Banks undertakings, as approximately 80
percent of projects approved have involved infrastructural development. The China
Exim Bank is increasingly making use of a deal structure - known as the “Angola model”
or “resources for infrastructure” - whereby repayment of the loan for infrastructure de-
velopment is made in terms of natural resources. While this approach is by no means
novel or unique, and follows a long history of natural resource - based transactions in the
oil industry - China has taken its implementation to a higher level (Executive Research
Associates 2009).
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robust in recent years, a major constraint on sustainable development has
been the very poor state of the continents infrastructure system. The in-
ability of economies to integrate themselves with neighbouring countries
to promote wider markets continues to be a serious obstacle to trade. This
reality has constricted the development of all sectors in Africa both pri-
mary and secondary. The logistical challenges that are imposed due to this
serve to constrain the ability to transport products within the region and
ultimately impede the formation of value chains for production. It is esti-
mated that Africa requires at least $US 40 billion per annum to fund and
maintain its existing core infrastructure capacity (Davies 2010).
According to the African Development Bank, China provided $US 4.5
billion in 2007 towards infrastructure projects, in many cases very size-
able scale projects. This is a major increase from $US 1 billion annually
from 2001-2003, but down from a peak of $US 7 billion in 2007 (Renard
2011). Chinese involvement in Africas infrastructure is also on the in-
crease. Whilst Africa specific data is not supplied, Chinas Ministry of
Commerce reports that its international construction projects stood at a
value of $US 7.96 billion in the first two months of 2009, up 24.8 per cent
year-on-year despite the financial crisis (MOFCOM 2010).
In terms of the power sector, research into Chinese policy bank financ-
ing in Africa reveals that great focus is placed on hydropower projects,
with approximately $US 5.3 billion being invested in this sector (Schiere
and Rugamba 2011). For example, most dam projects undertaken by Chi-
nese companies have a hydro-power dimension to them. In October 2008,
SinoHydro concluded a loan agreement with the Ghanaian government
for $US 562 million (Executive Research Associates 2009). The project val-
ued at $US 660 million is to provide 400 MW of power to be distributed
nationally and to neighbouring countries. It is estimated that almost two-
thirds of Africa states have received finance from China mostly through
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China EXIM Bank for thermal and hydro power projects in Africa. The
World Bank states that Chinese funded projects will generate a power ca-
pacity of more than 6000 megawatts over a third of Africas currently ex-
isting hydropower generating capacity.
In the rail sector, Chinese financing commitments in Africa are report-
edly standing at no less than $US 4 billion for rehabilitation of both old
lines that were mostly damaged through conflict as well as new line con-
struction. Large deals have been announced in Nigeria, Gabon and Mau-
ritania. The Nigeria deal was out on hold after its change in government
two years ago, but in October 2009 an agreement was signed to construct
a railway line from the capital Abuja to Kaduna valued at $US 850 mil-
lion and to be constructed over a three year period. In the realm of ICT,
China EXIM Bank is providing finance for the supply of equipment hard-
ware from leading firms such as ZTE and Huawei Technologies. Another
World Bank estimate in 2008 finds that Chinese telecommunication firms
have supplied over $US 3.2 billion worth of telecommunications equip-
ment to Africa with particular reference to Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa
and Sudan (Schiere and Rugamba 2011).
2 Capital Flows and Economic Development
Orthodox literature circulates around mainly three points when discussing
the role of FDI - reasons for company internationalisation strategies, de-
terminants for investments abroad, as well as their impact of economic
growth for the host country. Whereas the first factors for company strat-
egy are mainly touched upon in business courses, the second stream fo-
cuses on capital allocation among different countries.
The third type looks more on the overall impact of capital inflows on
the host country in terms of economic development, economic growth and
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sustainability, and determines whether external financial flows contribute
to it or not. For the purpose of this paper, the latter is considered to be the
essence of the discussion.
Economic growth theory purports, and empirics show considerable ev-
idence, that high investment rates are necessary for sustainable growth.
However, in particular developing countries, where significant growth in
domestic savings is absent, often may rely on foreign savings to boost do-
mestic investment rates. In these countries the marginal productivity rate
of capital may still be very high what makes them under normal circum-
stances very attractive for return-on-investment seeking foreign investors,
given that the investment climate is not too risky in terms of political sta-
bility and the overall framework for conducting business.
That this is not always the case has been bitterly evidenced through-
out the last decades and examples of conflict-ridden countries are myriad.
Some exceptions can be found among resource blessed countries, partic-
ularly these offering windfall profits through crude oil exploitations. But
often even there the risk of social upheaval and armed conflicts is om-
nipresent3, sometimes fueled by religious and ethnic motives, terrorism or
a even dubious role played by Western commodity exploitation contrac-
tors4.
Thus, apart from the commodity extracting industry, Sub-Saharan Africa
has until recently almost been completely cut off from international finan-
3According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, since 1946 Nigeria, for example,
has experienced continuously interstate, intrastate, non-state and one-sided violence.
With civilian rule taking over in 1999, inter-ethnic tensions heightened in Nigeria and
a vast number of non-state armed conflicts erupted in the 2000s.
4According to an investigation by several non-governmental organization, Shell has
allegedly contributed to armed conflicts in Nigeria trough funding of feudal militant
groups (Smith 2011).
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cial flows, despite of an urgent need for external finance due to very low
domestic savings and low income levels. ’External capital is needed to
supplement domestic savings in order to spur investment and growth’
(Asiedu 2002: 107). This is where China comes into the play and the next
paragraph attempts tracing China’s steps on the African continent in order
to identify the countries with the highest stakes in the investment portfo-
lio.
3 The Countries
As with most investments taken, also the financial engagement in coun-
tries China is the most active is driven by the strategic return it yields
for the central government, in financial and political terms. These invest-
ments, mainly in credit lines from aforementioned actors, are mainly pro-
vided in a form of FDI for infrastructure and have often a tremendous
impact on economic growth for the respective countries or even the whole
region (IMF 2011). Also following Berthelemy (2011), Chinese assistance
has traditionally focused on countries with which it has good political re-
lations and countries with oil and mineral resources. Let’s have a closer
look on the Chinese impact.
Weisbrod and Whalley (2011: 3) report that ’in the three years before
the 2008 financial crisis, GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa (averaged over
individual economies) was around 6 percent, 2 percentage points above
the mean growth in the preceding ten years. This period also coincided
with significant Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into these
countries, accounting for as much as 10 percent of total inward FDI for
some countries’.
This development has even expanded during the recent financial crisis
years up to today. Chinese capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa amounted
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to $US 64 million in the period 1979 to 2000. Yet, alone in 2003 Chinese FDI
surpassed the inflow of the last 20 years with a by then peak level of $US
70.14 million. By 2007, financial flows reached the $US 1 billion threshold
with climbing to new heights since then. Compared to overall interna-
tional engagement on the African continent, China invests a relative high
proportion of its capital outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chinese capi-
tal flows accounted for around 5 percent of total Chinese outward invest-
ments over the period 2003-2009, whereas during the last three decades,
roughly 2.05 percent of annual global FDI went to African countries below
the Sahara (MOFCOM 2010).
Given the large number of African countries, we focus on the largest
economies and the largest recipients of Chinese inward FDI. Particularly,
we scrutiny in more detail six economies (Angola, Botswana, Niger, Nige-
ria, Sudan, and Zambia) where Chinese capital flows have had either con-
siderable growth effects to their national economies or are major supplier
of imports to the Chinese economy5. These six selected countries alone
accounted for about 25.7 percent of overall African FDI in 2009, reaching
even a higher level of 30 percent in 2010 (MOFCOM 2010).
The two figures below describe the situation for our six selected African
countries quite intuitively. The Figure 1 displays developments in GDP,
where according to the red-colored mean since the early 2000s some progress
has been made on average, some countries are still lagging behind, others,
like Botswana, have presumably accelerated their economic development
and profit from stable economic and political conditions.
5Angola, e.g., as the third largest economy in Africa after Nigeria and South Africa,
has surpassed Nigeria in August 2011 in terms of oil exports and occupies at the moment
the position of leading oil supplier to China (Grill, B. 2011)
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Figure 1: GDP Development
The debt service in Figure 2 compared to percentage of exports has
been on a steady decline since the middle of the last decade and exhibits
thus a counter movement compared to GDP growth rates. Generally speak-
ing, the debt to export ratio has, except for the already sustainably oper-
ating Botswana, declined tremendously and the trend hints at further de-
crease after a small surge in debt figures due to the recent global economic
crisis.
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Figure 2: Total Debt Service (Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services,
Income)
The overall picture looks pretty promising for the majority of the African
countries. In the next large section it will be discovered how these rather
positive figures translate into international market perceptions.
4 The Role of Currency Reserves
It is this concentration of funds in infrastructure together with the char-
acteristic of being almost “free of charge” through preferred credit lines
and export buyer’s credits that give these financial flows for simplicity
the quality of cheaply available foreign reserves. This assumption is not
completely fallacious and related to the vast Chinese engagement in in-
frastructure construction described a few paragraphs earlier.
Literature suggests that reserves are held for both transaction and pre-
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cautionary motives (Mendoza 2004). Particularly the transaction motive
may apply in the assumption of “converting” Chinese capital flows, i.e.
to a major part FDI, into currency reserves for the usage of transaction
payments for infrastructure. Under normal circumstances, infrastructure
projects would have been undertaken requiring a decrease of reserves in
case of paying external contracting. This assumption is consistent with
the a priori expectation as most African countries suffer from poor infras-
tructure and weak institutional environment. Corkin et al. (2008) thus ar-
gue that increased public investment in infrastructure is therefore a factor
that stimulates private investment in these countries. With the provision
of non-concessional loans and credits with an emphasis on infrastructure,
China in a sense provides both finance and contractors to complete the
operation, viz. supply and demand may be considered to come from the
same source.
Also the success of Chinese companies in the African construction sec-
tor comes to no surprise, as they have already gained somewhat a compet-
itive advantage in infrastructure supply. Given the rapid inroads that they
have made in Africas construction industries in a short period of time, it is
evident that Chinese companies have a degree of competitive advantage
over other market players. The most important factors are access to cap-
ital, supply-chain costs and labour productivity, factors in which Chinese
companies thwart every competitor (see e.g. Foster et al. 2008).
Having stated the theoretical foundations of the paper, it is now time
to indulge in the outline of the empirical part in the next section.
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III Empirical Methodology
’The movements in the sovereign bond spread of a particular country in-
dicate changes in the expectations of the international financial markets
about the probability of default by that country’ (Woo 2000: 4).
A country’s debt sustainability, or respectively its probability to de-
fault, is often measured by spreads, a parameter of international financial
markets for the risk taken compared to safe assets. Conversely, sovereign
credit ratings focus more on the domestic situation of the economy. How-
ever, both indicators are connected, what is the reason for a two-folded
empirical part. I first try to estimate the sovereign credit ratings for coun-
tries that have not yet been granted a sovereign credit rating by an major
rating agency, Fitch Ratings. Estimates are composed for every year based
on macroeconomic variables, even though countries were not rated that
frequent. The regression analysis is composed along cross-section as we
want to find linear relations between the variables and the rating, not hy-
pothesis testing.
The study focuses on country risk, not individual bonds characteristics.
Therefore, data from World Bank staff calculations based on Datastream is
employed, and not individual bond prices, as dependent variables. Spe-
cific bond characteristics, e.g. issue size, call feature or maturity, are not
included as independent variables in the model.
Instead, this paper wants to rely on a model of “push” and “pull” fac-
tors originally employed to describe the reasons for capital flows from ma-
ture to low income countries (LIC). According to Fratzscher (2011), not
as recently as the 2008 crisis has brought up the question of what has
been driving both capital flows and ups and downs in their distribution
what remains highly controversial. Some have stressed the importance of
push factors, i.e. in particular monetary and fiscal policies in advanced
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economies, as the main culprits behind this surge in capital flows. Con-
versely, others have emphasized pull factors, such as real divergences be-
tween emerging market economies and industrialized nations, as the main
driver of the current pattern of capital flows. This framework has been
used already several times in finance and macro literature. An often cited
work by Montiel (2003) relates in a simple macro model these two factors
by comparing an economy’s domestic return factor with world costs of
funds. In here, when employing push and pull factors, particular empha-
sis is put on the separation of domestic and international market factors.
As it will be shown, sovereign credit ratings are based on mainly domestic
factors pulling capital into a country, whereas international market fac-
tors push financial flows into a certain direction. Checks on the impact of
variables on market sentiment will be introduced when dealing with bond
spreads.
Compared to bond spreads as the dependent variable, I consider the
debt-to-GDP ratio less suitable for the job, as it does not provides further
insight about the sustainability of public financing. The ratio might be
high, however, debt may be invested in profitable projects such as, for in-
stance, education, which might be sustainable in the long run. Moreover,
the conventional debt-to-GDP measure links debt, a future stock variable
as it is paid back in the future, to a current stock variable as nominal GDP
is not ’a debt duration-equivalent future nominal GDP’ (Markovich 2011:
2). Thus, the sheer scale of the ratio may be misleading.
The next section starts our departure into the more technical aspects
of this paper, first commencing with an overview of existing literature
and techniques on the estimation of sovereign credit ratings as well as
the presentation of the model used for providing the “pull” factor behind
financial flows to countries. Later on, the bond rating estimates are imple-
mented in the regression analysis checking for an impact of capital inflow
on debt sustainability, i.e. the probability of default on foreign debt in the
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selected African countries.
IV Determining Sovereign Credit Ratings
Rating agencies, due to their business practice, do not officially disclose
the precise models used for their rating methodologies. A common prac-
tice among rating agencies is, for instance, to assign qualitative scores to
several criteria and then arrive at a weighted average score. Beers and
Cavanaugh (2005) provide an explanation of the criteria used by Stan-
dard&Poors. They list 44 variables grouped under 10 categories political
risk, income and economic structure, economic growth prospects, fiscal
flexibility, general government debt burden, off-budget and contingent li-
abilities, monetary flexibility, external liquidity, public sector external debt
burden, and private sector external debt burden. Both the scoring and the
weights used to arrive at the final average rating are influenced by sub-
jective judgment of the rating analysts. Therefore, many critics argue that
country risk ratings should not be determined by mechanical models due
to their presumed randomly assigned weights and variables involved.
Nevertheless, many researchers have found that the ratings by major
agencies can be explained to a large extent by a handful of macroeconomic
variables. Ratha et al.(2011) provide a brief overview of hitherto done
work. Lee (1993) estimated a linear regression model with panel data
for 40 developing countries for 1979-87 using growth, inflation, growth
volatility, international interest rates, industrial countries growth rate, debt
to exports ratio, and dummies for geographical location as explanatory
variables for ratings. In an often-cited article, Cantor and Packer (1996)
used a cross-sectional regression model of sovereign credit ratings as a
function of per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance and
external balance, external debt, default history, and an indicator for the
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level of economic development. This study used a cross-section of high
income and developing countries, a short coming of the work we come
back later. Rowland and Torres (2004) estimated a similar model using
pooled time-series and cross-section data to identify the determinants of
sovereign ratings and spreads. Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) employed
a similar model to examine whether ratings were procyclical during the
Asian crisis by comparing predicted with actual ratings and draw conclu-
sions on how estimations should be done afterwards. Reinhart et al.(2003)
estimate similar cross-section and panel regression models for evaluating
debt intolerance, the duress that many emerging market countries expe-
rience at debt levels that would seem manageable by industrial country
standards.
Another article, almost as often cited as Cantor and Packer, is written
by Sutton (2005) who used an instrumental variable estimation in order to
tackle the potential reverse causality that runs from ratings to debt bur-
dens. Yet he found little evidence of reverse causality, and concluded that
ordinary least squares (OLS) may be the most appropriate technique.
As it has been discovered, a common finding from this set of papers is
that sovereign ratings can be explained to a significant extent by a handful
of macroeconomic variables. In trying to develop a model for predicting
sovereign ratings, we proceed in the following manner. First, sovereign
ratings for the rated developing countries as a function of several macroe-
conomic variables are estimated. Later on, the econometric model is used
to predict ratings for developing countries that did not have a rating.
1 Data and OLS
For setting up an accurate model for rating prediction, we rely on the real
credit ratings from Fitch Ratings due to the availability of data. In the
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model, credit ratings taken are the long-term foreign currency debt rat-
ings assigned to a sample of initially 31 national sovereign governments6
that have been rated as of late 2011. Yet, in order to rank the ratings and
use them as our dependent variable, the letters need to be transformed
into a numerical equivalent according to the Fitch debt rating classifica-
tion. As in the scale described in Table 1 below, the top rating “AAA”for
highest credit quality becomes equal to 1 and 21 denotes the lowest rating
“C” in the category “Very high default risk”. Ratings below this thresh-
old are not taken into consideration as reasons for actual default cannot
precisely pinpointed and may be derived from a variety of causes ranging
from deep structural problems in public finances or the domestic economy
to the simple unwillingness of a country to service its debt even before the
default (e.g. Baer et al. 2009).
The subsequent Table 1 offers a description of Fitch ratings translated
into a numeric scale.
6The sovereign ratings available were those from the countries of Angola, Australia,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Do-
minican Republic, El Salvador, France, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Namibia, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, The Philippines, Romania, Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United States and Zambia
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Table 1: Sovereign Ratings: Conversion from Letters to Numeric Grades
Fitch Ratingsa Numeric Expression
Investment Grade
Highest Credit Quality AAA 1
Very High Credit Quality AA+ 2
AA 3
AA- 4
High Credit Quality A+ 5
A 6
A- 7
Good Credit Quality BBB+ 8
BBB 9
BBB- 10
Speculative Grade
Speculative BB+ 11
BB 12
BB- 13
Highly Speculative B+ 14
B 15
B- 16
High Default Risk CCC+ 17
CCC 18
CCC- 19
Very High Default Risk CC 20
C 21
a Sources: Fitch Ratings
In order to estimate the ratings for our hitherto unrated countries un-
der closer scrutiny, a regression is set up based on the numeric rating
equivalents from the table above. The regression tries to model ratings
as of year t = 2011 as a function of lagged explanatory variables for t−1 =
2010. Lagged values of the explanatory variables are used instead of con-
temporaneous ones in order to limit potential reverse causality between
dependent and explanatory variables. The technique employed is ordi-
19
nary least squares (OLS) for a cross-section of available ratings, following
the above literature on modeling sovereign credit ratings (e.g. Cantor and
Packer 1996, Sutton 2005 and more recently e.g. Canuto et al. 2011).
The obtained numeric ratings will then be regressed on a number of
independent variables.
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Table 2: Description of Independent Variables
Variable
Name
Definition of Data Sources Unit of Measurementa Data Sources
GNI Gross National Income
per Capita in 2010
Thousand Current US$ World Bank Development In-
dicators, IMF World Economic
Outlook 2010, EuroStat
GDPGrowth Average annual real GDP
Growth Rate in 2010
Percent World Bank Development In-
dicators, IMF World Economic
Outlook 2010, EuroStat
Inflation Average annual consumer price
inflation rate in 2010
Percent World Bank Development In-
dicators, IMF World Economic
Outlook 2010, EuroStat
Liquidity Indicator for short-term liquid-
ity [Foreign Reserves / (Short-
term debt + Imports)]7, 2010
Percent World Bank Development Indi-
cators,
IMF World Economic Outlook
2010, EuroStat, ADB
DebtExports Public and Publicly Guaranteed
(PPG) External Debt over Ex-
ports of Goods and Services,
2010
Percent World Bank Development In-
dicators, IMF World Economic
Outlook 2010, EuroStat, ADB
CPI Indicator for institutional qual-
ity, Corruption Perception Index
of Transparency International in
2010
Corruption Perception
Range from 1 to 10
Transparency International Cor-
ruption Perception Index 2010
Note: IMF = International Monetary Fund, ADB = Asian Development Bank
a GNI, DebtExports and CPI are transformed to natural logarithm in the regression analysis
7The rule is named after Pablo Guidotti, Argentine former deputy minister of finance,
and Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States.
Guidotti first stated the rule in a G-33 seminar in 1999, while Greenspan widely publi-
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Having stated the variables we intend to use for estimating sovereign
ratings, this section will relate our independent variables to the regression
in terms of potential impact on the numeric rating equivalents defined pre-
viously in Table 1. However, one has to mention that rating agencies such
as Fitch, Moody’s, or Standard & Poor’s define several criteria for evaluat-
ing a country’s ability and willingness to service its debt. Although some
information on these decision parameters is disclosed, many factors are
still difficult to evaluate or simply not quantifiable and agencies provide
little guidance on the weight these variables play in country risk analysis.
The approach undertaken in this work is based on the following variables:
• GNI. Income per capita is considered as the main variable measuring
economic development. The better developed a country is and the
higher its per capita income, most likely the more politically stable is
the country which positively affects the economic environment. This
may favour the potential tax base which provides the sovereign with
greater tax incomes rendering it more able to repay debt. Given our
rating scale aforementioned, the coefficient should have a negative
sign with higher GNI per capita leading to better ratings, i.e. lower
numerical grades.
• GDPGrowth. A relatively high rate of economic growth suggests that
a countrys existing debt burden will become easier to service over
time. Again, this variable also may act as a proxy for political stabil-
ity and economic potential signaling a favourable economic environ-
ment. We expect the real growth rate of GDP to behave in a similar
way as per capita income.
• Inflation. A high rate of inflation points to structural problems in a
cized it in a speech at the World Bank (Greenspan 1999). Guzman Calafell and Padilla
del Bosque (2002) found that the ratio of reserves to external debt is a relevant predictor
of an external crisis.
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country’s public finances. A government resorting to inflationary
monetary policy at least appears unable or unwilling to pay for cur-
rent budgetary expenses through taxes or debt issuance. Moreover,
public dissatisfaction with inflation may in turn lead to political in-
stability. The coefficient for inflation should be positive as a higher
inflation rate should lead to a deteriorating credibility in the ability
to pay back sovereign debt.
• Liquidity. The liquidity variable is a combination of the now so-called
Greenspan-Guidotti rule and the former conventional wisdom that
foreign reserves should cover at least three months of imports. This
independent variable provides an indicator for a country’s short-
term foreign currency liquidity condition with the rational to resist a
massive withdrawal of short-term foreign capital (Ferri et al. 1999).
The prevalence a sudden capital withdrawal may in particular be an
assumption for low-income and developing countries with a promis-
ing economic outlook but a risk for severe disturbances. As some of
the countries used in the regression belong to this domain, includ-
ing the African countries of emphasis in this work, this variable in
considered to play an important role in determining sovereign credit
ratings. Accordingly, the variable should be negatively denoted as
larger currency reserves avoid short-term insolvency and thus have
a positive impact on the sovereign credibility.
• DebtExports. A higher percentage of public and publicly guaranteed
external debt over exports indicates a higher debt burden for the
sovereign what should correspond to a higher probability of default.
This ratio may also give hints on external competitiveness as the ra-
tio increases with foreign currency debt on the rise and a decline in
exports. Hence, the higher the ratio of PPG debt over exports, the
lower the sovereign rating, which is indicated by a positive coeffi-
cient.
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• CPI. Economic growth theory recognizes functioning institutions as
one of the main sources influencing the prosperity of a country. The
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) works
as a proxy for institutional quality and the rule of law and may pro-
vide insights into the effectiveness of a country’s bureaucracy. Good
or bad perceptions in turn have an impact on the overall business en-
vironment for foreign investments influencing economic growth as
well as provide signals for the sovereign tax receipts. The CPI coeffi-
cient should then be negative as less corruption yields a better credit
rating.
2 Results and Interpretation
Before reporting estimates, awareness about some frictions regarding the
data in the model employed needs to be raised. Apart from the lack of con-
sistent data for some countries, it is also advisable to avoid the influence of
fixed effects and selection biases among the countries chosen. In order to
avoid the latter and to make our model more fitting for the African coun-
tries, we exclude all advanced countries from the sample7, what makes us
ending up with 20 less developed countries mainly from Asia and Latin
America.
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of the previously stated parameters
for our sample of the 20 most recently rated countries to create a bench-
mark the shadow ratings for our targeted African countries can be based
upon8. Concerning the sample estimates, the theory discussed above would
seem to receive substantial support from the data. Per capita income, in-
stitutional quality, inflation rate as well as the liquidity and external debt
variables are all statistically significant, and our important liquidity vari-
7With dropping developed countries, we avoid a shortcoming of the Cantor and
Packer (1996) model. Yet, data may still be subject to minor biases in country selection.
8The respective Stata output has been attached to the document in the Appendix.
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able is significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, all of the significant
variables have the expected signs. Furthermore, the explanatory power of
the regression is high; the adjusted R-squared statistic is just above 0.81
and consistent with other studies on that topic.
Table 3: OLS Estimates
Constant GNI CPI Inflation Liquidity DebtExports GDPGrowth
14.303*** -1.704** -1.28** 0.127** -0.042*** 0.368** 0.052
(8.91) (3.01) (2.52) (2.93) (4.47) (2.16) (1.04)
Note: Absolute values of t-Statistics are reported in parentheses
***
Significant at the 1 percent level.
**
Significant at the 5 percent level.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level.
Other variables used such as e.g. Gross Government Debt, are not sig-
nificant, neither is GDPGrowth which exhibits also the wrong sign. Ex-
planations for this quite subtle result may be that mere GDP growth rates
have not much to say about the structural underpinnings of an economy.
Particularly resource abundant countries often heavily rely on only one
export good, what drives resources into the commodity extraction sector
and prevents them from being used sustainably elsewhere.
Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity among variables are not exhib-
ited according to respective test statistics9.
It is plausible that some of the coefficients may be inconsistent and
causality may be confounded in this regression due to potential presence
of reverse causality from ratings to some of the explanatory variables. In
other words, income per capita or the corruption index may itself depend
9Very low Chi2 does not hint at presence of heteroscedasticity; VIF-Statistics 5 20 and
1/VIF-Statistics = 0.5 does not provide evidence for multicollinearity
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on ratings. There are two reasons why this may not present serious diffi-
culties for our purpose. First, this is a cross sectional study and we have
deliberately used lagged data for all the independent variables, instead of
contemporaneous values. Second, our purpose is to use the regression
model as a best linear predictor of ratings, rather than for hypothesis-
testing. In a cross section, this method gives reasonably good results.
The previous assumptions stated, each independent variable is multi-
plied by the appropriate coefficient and values are summed on the indi-
vidual country level to produce a numeric value serving as a proxy for
sovereign credit quality or the respective hitherto not obtained credit rat-
ing. As we can see in the following table comparing real ratings with es-
timated ones, the regression is quite an accurate predictor of sovereign
credit ratings with a difference of one notch in the majority of cases:
Table 4: Comparison of Actual and Predicted Ratings as of 2011
Country Sovereign Ratinga Shadow Rating
Angola BB- BB - BB+
Nigeria BB- B+ - BB-
Turkey BB+ BB - BB+
El Salvador BB BB+
a Sources: Fitch Ratings
The next section follows with revealing the impact of capital inflows
on bond spreads.
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V Evaluating the Impact of Capital Inflows on
Bond Spreads
After having found already a clear influence of capital flows on the first
sustainability determinant, it is now attempted to determine an impact on
bond yield spreads through employing the previously obtained shadow
ratings.
In order to gain a first feeling on how ratings and yield spreads are
connected, the calculation of the non-parametric Spearman’s rank correla-
tion coefficient might be considered useful. The result of the test output
(see Appendix) is not surprising, as there is a positive correlation between
the two, although very loosely with a Spearman’s ρ = 0.1386. This result
confirms both intuition and logic that a lower ranking, viz. a higher nu-
merical equivalent, yields a higher spread on the bond market.
A conventional approach to modeling equilibrium sovereign yields is
to assume that the spread over a risk-free interest rate is a function of the
probability of default of a country, here proxied by previously obtained
shadow ratings, and of the loss given default. In reduced-form models,
this probability of default is exogenously determined and is tied to the
sustainability of a given level of external debt through liquidity or sol-
vency indicators, and hence to a set of macroeconomic fundamentals. For
example, assuming risk neutral lenders and competitive financial markets,
and following the standard model of risk premia, we might follow e.g. Ed-
wards (1984) and employ, according to our theoretical underpinning, the
following regression as a panel data model with spreads as the dependent
variable:
sit = α +
∑J
j=1 βjitxjit + it
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where sit is the yield spread of country i at time t, α is an intercept coef-
ficient, the βjs are slope coefficients, the xjs are a set of J international mar-
ket variables as “push” factors as well as our previously obtained shadow
rating estimate as a “pull” factor,  are i.i.d. error terms. In other more
complex frameworks, e.g. Sachs (1981) arrive at similar findings.
1 Time Frame Considerations
Beck (2001) emphasizes the distinction of different time horizons for the
estimation. Whereas short-term spread fluctuations are mainly driven by
daily demand and supply factors, technical aspects as well as political
news, they do not have effects on a country’s credit standing or proba-
bility of default in the long run as macroeconomic variables seem rarely
influenced by short-lived news. Our focus lies in the long-term time hori-
zon of a year-to-year period, where impacts of events at short notice are
considerably smoothed out or are entirely without any effect on determin-
istic macroeconomic variables.
Estimation sovereign bond spreads via shadow bond ratings, the rat-
ings are expected to be significant, since both of them are a measure of
sovereign risk. However, if the sovereign spreads and ratings refer to
the same thing, which is the probability that a country defaults on its
debt, they may have some common determinants and reverse causality
may thus arise as a problem. Yet, the reason why this probability may
be low, is that while ratings are a long-term assessment of the sovereign
risk, sovereign spreads can provide more precise point-in-time measures
of the sovereign risk. The here employed World Bank Data on spreads10
are arithmetical averages of monthly spread values where long-run cycli-
10Here we use World Bank data instead of relying on J.P Morgan’s EMBI+ Index due
to non-availability of data as well as a heavy bias of the index towards Latin American
countries (Sy 2002).
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cal impacts are mitigated.
2 Panel Data Analysis
As evidenced by Rowland and Torres (2004), a panel data approach takes
into account both the heterogeneity of the countries and the variables which
are constant over time. This advantage of the panel data is one reasons
why time series or a cross-sectional analysis is not used. Also, the panel
data approach copes better with the problem of collinearity. Multicollinear-
ity is troublesome when it comes to time series analysis and when it comes
to macroeconomic variables of the kind employed in this research.
For the panel data regression 9 countries are used, again out the emerg-
ing economies pool11. Also here shadow ratings are estimated accord-
ingly in order to keep variable sizes concise with previous estimations.
Data availability for the selected countries is perfect, we yield a strongly
balanced panel. As it has already been stated, the check for influence of
capital flows through the reserve variable on spreads relies on the afore-
mentioned push - pull model for financial flows. The independent vari-
able catching domestic effects has been estimated, the shadow bond rat-
ings. Furthermore, two theoretically ideal variables for catching for inter-
national interest rates and international market sentiment are used. An-
nual variations of the VIX12, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market
Volatility Index measuring the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options,
are computed, as well as the annual LIBOR rate, the London Interbank Of-
fered Rate, is taken as a proxy for international interest rates.
11Countries this time employed are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Nigeria, Peru,
Philippines, South Africa, Turkey.
12For a brief description of the VIX as an indicator for market sentiment, i.e. financial
market uncertainty, see Dueker (1999). An alternative index could be the NASDAQ.
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The estimation is specified as a fixed effects model. This specification
can be considered as appropriate if we expect country-specific intercepts
to reflect different levels of spreads exhibiting time-invariant factors and
if the assumption goes that no random process has led to these intercepts
in the sample. According to Beck (2001: 14), ’fixed effects in this model
then represent structural solvency variables’. This assumption can be ver-
ified by using the Hausman test for either taking a fixed or a random ef-
fect model. It basically tests whether the unique errors it are correlated
with the independent variables, the null hypothesis rejects this assump-
tion (Green 2008). By contrasting fixed effects estimation and random ef-
fects estimation, Prob>chi2 = 0.0331 and thus significantly lower than 5
percent what leads to a fixed effects model.
VI Results and Interpretations
The first executed regression with all variables included provides us with
a highly significant sovereign rating variable for domestic effects with the
right positive sign for the coefficient, given the scaling of our rating equiv-
alents from small numbers for excellent ratings deteriorating to higher
figures. This goes in line with the previous Spearman test result, where
higher numeric equivalents yield higher bond spreads. Unfortunately, all
international market variables are highly insignificant. Yet, this may be
explained through the availability of global liquidity and well interlinked
global financial markets which become theoretically more and more ef-
ficient in distributing resources and thus cater towards an alleviation of
risks and fears of market actors.
Testing for groupwise heteroscedasticity via the Wald test, the null hy-
pothesis is rejected and heteroscedasticity thus present. This will be taken
care of with using robust standard errors. Serial correlation tests apply to
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macro panels with long lasting time series and are not considered to be a
problem in micro panels (under 20 - 30 years) (Hoechle 2007). Results can
be found in the table below (Stata output as always in the Appendix):
Table 5: Within Panel Data Regression
Constant Rating VIX LIBOR
−126.3111** 70.08901** −4.345754 4.546114
(2.63) (3.15) (1.23) (0.60)
Note: Absolute values of t-Statistics are reported in parentheses
Note: All independent variables are transformed into natural logarithms
***
Significant at the 1 percent level.
**
Significant at the 5 percent level.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level.
Results remain consistent with the previous regression, even though
variables face a slight deterioration in significance. However, the well be-
low the 5 percent level significant Rating variable exhibits also here a pos-
itive coefficient. A rating downgrade indicates deterioration in macroeco-
nomic stability and external sustainability of a given economy, and subse-
quently an increase in spreads.
Having our independent variables transformed into natural logarithms,
interpretation says that a one percent increase in the independent variable
increases (or decreases) the dependent variable by (coefficient/100) units.
This implies for the Ratings that a 1 percent increase in the sovereign rat-
ing results in an increase of .7 units in the spread13. With the insertion of a
Chinese ODI figure into the liquidity variable above, the impact on bond
spread evaluation of capital flows, our previous assumptions provided,
13In order to provide a relation, according to Reuters, Greek 10-year government bonds
moved to a spread level 614 basis points higher compared to the German benchmark on
April 26, 2010.
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can be evaluated. A multiplication of the liquidity variable with the Rat-
ing variable of the panel data finally allows us to estimate the impact on
bond spreads as well. Despite of being quite a small number, the results of
this paper may find at least a slight positive impact on spreads originating
from Chinese capital flows.
VII Conclusion & Shortcomings
After estimation results have been outlined, shortcomings of the mod-
els employed cannot be kept undisclosed. Admittedly, the paper suffers
from some inconsistencies, mainly arising due to lack of data ranging from
only a limited amount of rated countries given the intention not to min-
gle developing and industrialized countries. Even though the selection of
countries has been cautiously pursued, selection bias cannot be entirely
avoided what may distort results obtained. Of course, with a larger sam-
ple estimation results become more accurate and may yield to an even
higher goodness of fit. Moreover, as it has already been stated, it is plau-
sible that some of the coefficients may suffer from reverse causality from
ratings to some of the explanatory variables. Reverse causality has been
tried to stay low through a lag in data collection. Yet, this may not be
enough and a suggestion could be to lag data twice in order to increase
the chance of complete randomness without any reverse influence.
A major issues is certainly in both regressions the rather limited amount
of independent variables at hand. Omitted variable bias can certainly be
alleged in the panel data, even though variables for international market
sentiment are not that frequent. However, many countries rely heavily on
the export of commodities14, what might entice someone to include an in-
14Main commodities exported: Oil (Angola, Nigeria, Sudan), Diamonds (Botswana),
Uranium (Niger), Copper (Zambia) (Bond 2006)
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dex on commodity prices in order to catch this impact on spreads. Slow
world growth may tighten international capital availability and may lead
to lower export growth in developing countries. Additionally, high oil
prices may lower a countrys external competitiveness and cause a deteri-
oration of the trade balance. This may lead to an increased demand for
foreign capital in oil importing countries, and possibly cause a balance of
payment crisis. Certainly, there are many more suggestions on the above
models employed and inclusion of some may be treated somewhere else.
Yet, the paper provides some important insights. From the point of
view of policy makers, sovereign ratings and with their significance in the
regression also bond spreads can be improved by relying on a rather small
sample of macroeconomic variables. If the achieve to steadily improve,
e.g. income per capita and the liquidity ratio, markets and rating agencies
most likely will award their efforts and access to capital markets become
easier and particularly cheaper when spreads are reduced. Moreover, it
has been discovered that even though quite small, Chinese capital flows
may have a positive impact on both ratings and spreads. Whether this
development is sustainable in the long-run, apart from the construction of
infrastructure and cheap loans, is a different question and will be kept for
future research.
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A Appendix
Regression and test tables for the sovereign rating estimation:
Figure 3: OLS Rating Estimation
Figure 4: Test for Heteroscedasticity
Figure 5: Test for Multicollinearity
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Tests and Panel Data for Bond Spread Regression:
Figure 6: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient
Figure 7: Hausman Test for fixed or random effects
35
Figure 8: Within Panel Regression
Figure 9: Modified Wald Test for Heteroscedasticity
Figure 10: Within Panel Regression with Robust Standard Errors
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